Methods of improving scalability in online auctions include limiting the number of bidding opportunities, providing price information to users, and recommending auctions that may be of interest to the users. We constructed an experimental prototype auction system in the context of reverse logistics for electronics products. Experiments were designed to test the effects of the number of trading opportunities and the amount of previous price and bid information presented to users. The participants' profits improved with the number of trading opportunities but showed mixed effects for increasing price and bid information. The induction of decision trees for an auction recommender is illustrated along with the use of attribute selection to reduce the size of the tree.
Introduction
In recent years, business to business e-commerce has emerged as an important means to enable efficient exchange, reduce marketing costs for sellers and procurement costs for buyers, and unify fragmented markets. Several e-commerce portals have been created for well-defined markets such as automotive parts (Covisint.com, 2001 ). On the other hand, a fragmented market is characterized by large, dynamic set of buyers and sellers who are generally unfamiliar with each other. One example is the market for post-retail and surplus items such as used products, returned and refurbished products, and surplus inventories of unsold products nearing obsolescence. In particular, because of their short lifecycles, large quantities manufactured and in use, and potential generation of hazardous waste, electronic products constitute one important category. Kokkinaki et al. (2001a) have identified several ways that electronic commerce could help to unify the markets in reverse logistics. Kokkinaki et al. (2001b) presented a prototype electronic marketplace for PCs including decision support for reuse, remanufacturing or recycling.
The designers of an e-commerce system meant to unify a fragmented market must consider (1) how to encourage participation in the online marketplace, and (2) how to ensure that the system can scale to handle increased traffic as participation grows. This paper focuses on the roles of exchange mechanisms and information delivery in achieving these two related goals. Potential participants will be encouraged to trade in an online marketplace if they perceive that the online system makes exchange easier and/or more profitable than exchanges outside it would be. The system could speed the identification of potential trading partners, provide an efficient exchange mechanism, and deliver useful information about recent prices of items while reducing the need for time-consuming online searches. By performing much of the time-consuming information processing offline or in periods of reduced traffic, these efforts to expand the market could simultaneously enhance the scalability of the system.
The information delivery methods studied in this paper can be better understood by contrast to a popular consumer-oriented online marketplace. Suppose you drop your personal digital assistant (PDA) on the floor and crack the screen. After a call to the manufacturer reveals a fairly steep repair price for your discontinued model, you decide to seek a replacement. Since you own several accessories for your old PDA, you are looking for an identical used or surplus model and, knowing the repair price, you have a ceiling on the amount you are willing to pay. A search for this model on eBay.com yields one thousand records of ongoing auctions, most of which are for accessories rather than the actual PDA. By laboriously examining pages of auctions, you choose several soon-to-end auctions and, by repeated page updates, watch them to learn the settlement prices. Then you choose an auction to enter and start bidding.
You can enter your maximum price and let the system bid up for you. In addition, you can ask to be notified when you are outbid. But you soon learn that in order to win your replacement PDA, you must closely monitor the auction in its final moments, which generally occur at an inconvenient time, and repeatedly enter new bids. You are likely to give up and pay the manufacturer's repair price.
Suppose in contrast that you were a regular buyer of used PDAs and that you could participate in a system that proactively notified you when an auction for your preferred model began. This system could inform you of current prices without repeated searches and careful monitoring of auctions on your part. Armed with this reliable price information, you could enter a single bid and then go about your business while the auction was resolved, knowing that other potential buyers were limited to a single bid as well.
Assuming you were satisfied with the auction outcomes, such a system would encourage your repeated business and would simultaneously save itself the burden of complying to numerous search requests, page refreshes, and bid updates (both automatic and manual).
We would expect that price information and limits on bidding opportunities would significantly affect buyer and seller behavior, the well-being of participants and the market as a whole. However, these effects have not been studied. In addition, the ability of knowledge discovery methods to reliably classify auctions as interesting to a particular buyer or not has not been rigorously tested. This paper describes an empirical study of a simulated business to business e-commerce system. Experiments were conducted to test the effects of different price information displays and different numbers of bidding opportunities.
Decision trees for an auction recommender system were constructed using the data collected. The results of data analysis and data mining for these initial experiments illustrate the promise of the recommender system and suggest several intriguing questions about auction design to explore in further research.
Internet auction has been extensively examined as a way to allocate goods and services effectively and efficiently (see e.g., Kumar and Feldman (1998) ). In this paper, we employ an auction mechanism called sealed bid double auction (see e.g., Wurman, Walsh, and Wellman, (1998) ). Under this auction mechanism, each of multiple potential sellers and multiple potential buyers can submit a bid only once during the auction. Each bid is "sealed" so that only the one that has submitted the bid has any knowledge of the bid throughout the auction process. This auction is, conceptually, one of the simplest auction models that are in use today. This model relatively (relative to, for example, the English auction model) induces participants to reveal their true valuation. Considering such factors as the conceptual simplicity, current usage in Internet auction, and relative revelation of true valuation, it is an ideal standard auction mechanism. That is, this mechanism can be used as a benchmark model later in the future when other auction mechanisms are comparatively studied.
Description of Experimental Prototype
For our experiment, we constructed a simulated auction environment. With emphasis on electronics recycling, our business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce participants consist of three Manufacturers, three Demanufacturers, and three Recyclers. Each participant is given a pre-specified level of cash and relevant inventory of items, and each participant's objective is to maximize the level of cash at the end of the auction process. At the end of the auction process, any leftover inventory is worthless.
The auction process consists of several rounds, in each of which there is an open auction for each type of item. In each round, a participant can bid a price and quantity to sell (of items the participant has) and a price and quantity to buy (of items the participant wants). Any cost and price factors that are not explicitly discussed in the next section are negligible.
Roles of Manufacturer, Demanufacturer, and Recycler
Each Manufacturer produces coffeemakers by using one CPU and one unit of Plastic. The Manufacturer can sell any number of coffeemakers at a fixed unit price of $20. The CPUs and the units of Plastic can be bought in any round of the auction process. At the end of each round, we assume that equal quantities of any CPUs and units of Plastic the Manufacturer has are immediately transformed into coffeemakers.
Finally, we assume that the Manufacturer is provided with an initial inventory of obsolete Computers, which can be sold in any round of the auction.
A Demanufacturer can buy obsolete Computers in any round of the auction process. As soon as the Demanufacturer gets them, they are immediately disassembled into memory boards, CPU's and Shells.
Each memory board is sold outside the auction system at $4 per unit. Also, if the Demanufacturer does not manage to obtain a fixed quota of memory boards, then the Demanufacturer will have to pay a cash penalty of $2 for each board the Demanufacturer is short after the last round. We assume that the Demanufacturer is provided with an initial inventory of CPUs and Shells. Such inventory as well as the CPUs and Shells from the disassembly of the obsolete Computers can be sold in any round of the auction. 
Sealed Bid Double Auction (SBDA) Mechanism
The auction process consists of either 3 rounds ("short" process) or 6 rounds of SBDA ("long" process).
In each round, for a pre-specified kind of product, each potential seller or buyer can submit a bid consisting of the desired quantity and the corresponding price that the potential buyer is maximally willing to pay or the potential seller is minimally willing to accept.
At the conclusion of a pre-specified bid submission period for each round, the auction processing unit rank orders all buy bids according to the maximally acceptable buying price (MABP) and all sell bids according to the minimally acceptable selling price (MASP). By matching rank ordered MABP's and MASP's as well as their respective bid quantities, the minimum MABP and the maximum MASP that maximizes the total transaction quantity can be found.
The settlement price is the average of the minimum MABP and the maximum MASP. If the total quantity demanded with the minimum MABP or higher is not equal to the total quantity supplied with the maximum MASP or lower, which should be the typical case, the following priority is given: Among buyers, the buyers with higher than the minimum MABP has the priority. Among sellers, the sellers with lower than the maximum MASP has the priority. It is quite possible that a buyer or a seller without priority may not be able to buy or sell all the quantity specified in the bid. We will assume that such a buyer or seller is willing to buy or sell less than the exact quantity specified in the bid. Finally, if two or more buyers submit the same MABP or sellers submit the same MASP, then the buyer or seller who submitted the bid earlier has the higher priority.
According to the settlement price and the regulations just described, the transaction records are revealed to all the sellers and buyers with winning bids. The auction process terminates after three rounds (short process) or six rounds (long process) of such SBDA.
Experimental Design
We designed the experiments to test the effects of two factors: the information level and the number of rounds in the auction. Each experiment consisted of one auction process. The information factor, INFO, had three levels. The MIN level displayed the settlement price of each auction only to the winning buyer and seller. The MED level displayed the settlement price of each auction to all participants in the auction.
The MAX level showed each participant in an auction not only the settlement price but also the price bids entered by his/her competitors (for a buyer, the other buy bids and for a seller, the other sell bids). The number of rounds (K) in each experiment had two levels: K = 3 for a short process or 6 for a long process. The level of 3 was chosen as the minimum number of rounds necessary for Computers sold by the Manufacturers to be transformed into Plastic available for their purchase. Six rounds were deemed to be long enough for the market to make maximum use of the starting inventories.
The subjects for the experiments were undergraduate engineering students at Iowa State University. We recruited 27 participants and randomly divided them into three groups, each of which participated in five experiments over two sessions. The first session for each group began with training and some practice rounds. Each subject adopted a different role (M, D, or R) for each experiment conducted in a given session. We conducted four experiments of each of the factor combinations 3*MED, 6*MIN, 6*MAX and one experiment of each of the factor combinations 3*MIN, 3*MAX, 6*MED. The combinations of factor levels were randomly assigned to subject groups and sessions.
Data Analysis
Online auctions provide a wealth of data from which we can study the behavior of participants, the evolution of prices, consensus about prices or the lack of it, and the overall economic outcomes for participants and the market as a whole. Let i be the index for participants where I is the initial stock of item j held by participant i. We valued these initial inventories using estimates of their value over all experiments. The value of item j was estimated as
. Then the net gain (loss if negative) for participant i in the lth experiment was computed as
In order to study the degree of consensus about item prices, we also computed the squared deviation of the bids about the settlement price in the successful auctions: 
Because we observed some qualitative differences in the three subject groups (for instance, one group appeared quiet and studious, while another were talkative), we first checked for any statistically significant differences in the outcomes. First we analyzed the overall outcomes of the experiments. For each of the response variables
, and F, we tested the null hypothesis that the subject groups were identical using a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test (n = 15). The subject group showed a significant effect only on T Q , the total quantity of material traded. Next we examined outcomes for individual participants. We analyzed the net gain or loss for each participant according to their type, G M , G D , G R ; as well as the number of brokering attempts by each individual participant. Of these six response variables, with 45 observations, the subject group membership was significant only for G M , the gain by Manufacturers. Despite these two warnings that the subject groups were not completely homogeneous, we felt that since homogeneity could not be rejected for most of the performance measures, we could group all the responses across subject groups for the remainder of the analysis in reasonable safety.
In this preliminary study, the sizes of the data sets were relatively small. The sample sizes were L = 15 experiments for the responses T j , F, and B T and n = 45 for G P and B P , where P = M, D, or R (15 experiments with 3 players of each type). Because assumptions of normality seemed untenable in most cases, we relied on nonparametric tests as much as possible. To analyze settlement prices and bid variation, we excluded any rounds in which the settlement price was zero, i.e., the auction had failed. We looked at the effect of the round number and found that if we also excluded the last round, in which all participants had the incentive to "dump" excess inventory and no one was motivated to buy Shells, the hypotheses that the round number had no effect on either settlement price or bid variation could not be rejected. Finally, in the bid variation analysis we eliminated two outlier bids (in two separate experiments) that were an order of magnitude larger than all the other bids. In the end, we had between 50 and 56 rounds of auctions, depending on the item, over which to analyze prices and bids.
Results
The number of trading opportunities (auction rounds in each experiment) could be expected to affect the wellbeing of participants as well as the health of the market. Based on the profit (gain) for each player i, we make the following observations. When we compare the profits from the three round auction with those from the six round auction, for all three groups of players (Manufacturers, Demanufacturers, and Recyclers), the average profit is substantially higher from the six round auction. We believe that this result occured because of the substantial expansion of the set of feasible strategies in the case of the six round auction. The longer experiments also appeared to encourage brokering behavior, particularly by
Recyclers.
With a couple of exceptions, the number of rounds had little effect on settlement prices or bid variation.
The mean settlement price for CPUs was significantly larger for K=3 than for K=6 rounds. The mean variation of bids for around the settlement price was larger for both Shells and Plastic in 3 rather than 6
rounds.
The settlement price information revealed to traders and would-be traders could have effects on their behaviors and their eventual economic wellbeing. A trader who was able to use this information effectively might profit by brokering items she did not want or simply by bidding more effectively on items she did want. We originally considered the MED level of information to be the typical amount of price information one would expect when participating in an auction (for instance, this is the information revealed by eBay). Surprisingly, we found that by some measures, participants tended to be worse off when presented with this information than when they received either less or more information about past settlement prices and bids. Generally speaking, the settlement prices and bid variations were similar under MIN and MAX information but different under the MED level of information. Due to the small sample sizes, not all these effects were statistically significant. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of information on settlement prices and squared deviations of bids about the settlement price for two different items. In particular, the mean settlement price for Computers took its smallest value under MED information, while the settlement prices for the other items were larger under MED information than under either MIN or MAX information. For each item, the mean bid variation was smallest under MED information. These results seem to suggest that by giving all players information about the settlement price, but not competitors' bids, the auction administrator could steer prices for items either higher or lower. Higher prices could be explained by a conjecture that, in contrast to MIN information, MED information motivates a potential buyer who failed to obtain items previously to bid higher than the known settlement price. Subsequent bids are steered to a narrow range just above the previous settlement price. However, if this buyer also learns the range of buy bids in the previous auction, he may feel more comfortable bidding somewhat lower than the previous settlement and, in any case, will not be steered to such a tight interval. Sellers would be motivated to bid in the opposite direction; however, in our setup there is more pressure for Manufacturers and Demanufacturers to buy parts and materials than there is to sell.
When we compare participant gain across the amount of information, the MIN information results in the highest average profit for all three groups. For the Manufacturer group and the Recycler group, the MAX information results in the second highest average profit. On the other hand, for the Demanufacturer group, the average profits under MAX and MED information differ by only 2.7%. Finally, we observe that the total average profit of all three groups under MIN information is substantially higher than that under MAX information. The total average profit of all three groups under MAX information, in turn, is substantially higher than that under MED information. These observations seem to suggest that the MED information case not only leads to a relatively narrow range of settlement prices, but also results in a relatively small amount of profit for all groups of players.
If the auction administrator is paid by a fraction of the profit, these results imply that it should strive to provide either MIN or MAX information, and to avoid providing MED information (though providing MAX information may be necessary especially if potential sellers and buyers demand it).
The total amount of material that changes hands during the auction process is smallest under MED information. Figure 4 
Auction Recommender
In this section we consider what can be learned about the preferences of the auction participants using knowledge discovery and data mining techniques. In particular, we are interested in what auctions might interest each user and should thus be identified or recommended. A recommender is a system that can identify which products and hence auctions are of interest to a particular user, and display the information that is relevant for the user to participate in such an auction. Such systems have received considerable attention in the literature with early recommender systems generally based on simple nearest-neighbor collaborative filtering algorithms (Resnick et al., 1994; Shardanand and Maes, 1995) . Later versions have used other learning methods, including Bayesian networks (Breese et al., 1998) , classification methods (Basu et al., 1998) , association rules (Lin et al., 2000) , regression (Vucetic and Obradovic, 2000) , and intelligent agents (Good, 1999) . The key to the successful implementation of such systems is knowing the participants: the more intimate this knowledge, the more likely it is that the system will be able to recommend the correct products.
To gain as much knowledge as possible about the behavior of the auction participants, a data set is From the experiments, 2592 data objects or instances were obtained, one for each user for each auction of every round. Each of these instances has a value for all of the 32 above mentioned attributes, including the class attributes that is equal to yes if the user participated in the auction and no otherwise. The knowledge discovery task of the recommender system is to relate the class attribute with the others, all of which are observable before an auction must be recommended.
Constructing a Recommendation
Before using data mining to construct a model for recommendation, let's consider how a very simplistic model might be constructed. Figure 5 . Top of the recommender decision tree
The relevant data mining problem for this context is classification. Classification is the process of building a model that describes a priori specified classes or concepts based on data objects with known classifications, and then using this model to classify new data objects where the class is unknown. Here the concept to be learned is whether or not a user wants to participate in an auction. The primary performance measure of classification models is its accuracy, but its scalability in terms of induction speed and use of memory is also a critical issue. The most common approach for classification is decision tree induction using algorithms such as C4.5 (Quinlan, 1993) and CART (Breiman, Friedman, Olshen, and Stone, 1984) . To build a recommender for the auction system a decision tree model is induced using the C4.5 decision tree algorithm. At the top the decision tree splits according to participant type (see Figure 5 ), so the three branches can be thought of as decision trees for a Manufacturer, Demanufacturer and a Recycler. Let's consider the tree in Figure 6 , which shows the branch or decision tree for a Manufacturer. Clearly, this decision tree implies the need for much more complicated recommendation model than the simplistic model above. As an example, let's read off the tree when a Computer auction should be recommended to a Manufacturer. The following rules can be directly inferred from the tree:
• If the time since the Manufacturer last participated in a Computer auction is less than or equal to one, then recommend the auction.
•
Otherwise, if the time since the Manufacturer last participated in a Computer auction is more than one, and the Manufacturer bought the Computers last time,
then recommend the auction.
• Otherwise, do not recommend the auction. This is an example of discovering structural knowledge. The decision tree not only provides a predictive model but also adds new insights into the decision making process of Manufacturers. Finally, note that these rules give a classification for each auction being either recommended or not recommended, but they do not give any confidence assessment of the quality of the recommendation. Now let's consider when a Shell auction should be recommended to this Manufacturer. The following rules can be read off the tree:
• If this Manufacturer has never participated in Shell auctions, then do not recommend the auction.
• Otherwise, if there has been more than one round since the last participation in a Computer auction, do not recommend the auction.
• Otherwise, if the Manufacturer's last participation in a Plastic auction was to sell Plastic, then do recommend the auction.
• Otherwise, if the time since the Manufacturer's last participation in a Plastic auction is less than one round, recommend the auction.
• Otherwise, do not recommend the auction. the Recycler obtained from the last auction is large (1100 units). These rules appear to be discovering the situation that the Recycler is no longer interested in buying more Shells and is only trying to sell the current inventory of Plastic. We finally note that the branch corresponding to Demanufacturer is similar in its discovery and, as indicated by Figure 5 , starts by splitting according to whether the item contains Plastic, that is, if the item is Plastic in which case it would only of interest for brokering, or if it is Computer, CPU, or Shells, in which case it would be of primary interest.
Attribute Selection
In this simple system the number of attributes is only 32 and is thus quite manageable for any standard induction algorithm. However, it is clear that this number of attributes will increase very rapidly. Let's first consider how many transactional attributes there are regarding a single item, such as a Computer:
Thus, for every new item there are six new transactional attributes, resulting in a very rapid explosion of the number of attributes as the number of items handled by the system increases. Next, let's consider the disassembly information:
ItemContainsCPU ItemContainsShell ItemContainsPlastic
Here there are only three attributes regarding components of the items. However, this is a function of the extreme simplification of the prototype system. When dealing with realistic products the number of component related attributes can be expected to grow very rapidly.
When the number of attributes becomes large, the scalability of the system may be compromised as the knowledge discovery algorithms do not always scale up in a satisfactory manner. Thus, it becomes imperative to use attribute selection to determine which attributes are essential to inducing a high quality recommender model. Such attribute selection is commonly used as a preliminary step preceding a learning algorithm such as decision tree induction and has numerous benefits. The resulting tree may be simpler, which often makes it easier to interpret and thus more useful in practice. It is also often the case that simple trees generalize better when they are used for prediction. Thus, a smaller tree is likely to score higher on interestingness measures and may score higher in accuracy. Finally, discovering which attributes should be kept often provides valuable structural information and is therefore important in its own right.
The literature on attribute selection is extensive, and some of the methods applied for this problem in the past include genetic algorithms (Yang and Honavar, 1998) , various sequential search algorithms (see e.g., Aha and Bankert, 1996; Caruna and Freitag, 1994) , correlation-based algorithms (Hall, 2000) , evolutionary search (Kim, Street, and Menczer, 2000) , rough sets theory (Modrzejewski, 1993) , randomized search (Skalak, 1994), branch-and -bound (Naranda and Fukunaga, 1977) , and the nested partitions method (Olafsson and Yang, 2001 ). These and other attribute selection methods are typically classified as either filtering or wrapper methods. Filtering methods produce a ranking of all attributes before the learning algorithm is applied. Wrapper methods use the learning algorithm to evaluate subsets of attributes. As a general rule, filtering methods are faster whereas wrapper methods usually produce subsets that result in more accurate models.
Using the NP-Wrapper attribute selection method developed by Olafsson and Yang (2001) , the following eleven attributes were selected for the entire decision tree (with C4.5 used to evaluate the attribute subsets): Note that attributes selected are from a variety of categories and the total number of attributes is reduced to about a third of the original size. With these attributes a new decision tree can be constructed. The branch corresponding to recommending auctions for a Manufacturer is shown in Figure 8 . This tree is clearly much simpler than the one constructed before (6 split nodes versus 15 nodes before), yet its accuracy is about the same or 84.5% versus 84.7% estimated using 10-fold cross validation. The induction time for this model is also much shorter, or 1.3 seconds versus 4.3 seconds using all attributes, and when the model is applied for classification in real time its simpler structure will result in a faster response. The trade-off with respect to time is that considerable computational time is expanded to select the attributes. However, this can be done off-line and therefore need not effect the scalability of the system adversely.
Conclusions
In order to build and sustain participation in an online auction site while allowing the system to scale robustly to a large number of users, site administrators might consider providing users with decision support, such as information about past prices and recommendations of current and upcoming auctions.
Scalability can also be enhanced by limiting the number of bidding opportunities for any given item. The results in this paper, based on limited experimentation with a simple prototype auction system, suggest that some apparently innocuous types of decision support can have unintended consequences for user behavior and profits, prices of items traded online, and the quantities of material traded. If the goal is to unify a fragmented market or generally to encourage exchange of items such as end-of-life electronics products, the methods used to achieve that goal may be self-defeating. To follow up this initial study, much further research needs to be done to discover more about the effects of price information displays, auction mechanisms (other than sealed bid double auction), and extensiveness of auction opportunities.
From the experimental data, we were able to illustrate the induction of decision trees for an intelligent recommender and to trim the set of relevant auction attributes it uses. The smaller attribute set provides greater scalability. We did not attempt to study the impacts of the recommender system on the outcomes for participants, prices or the market as a whole. Our findings on price information suggest that it is dangerously easy to lead the market in directions that benefit neither it nor its participants. Much further research, both analytical and experimental, is necessary to help auction site administrators design effective decision support systems that achieve the goals of their sites.
